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1.. Introduction 
The natme of the right to education and the extentto which it is judicially enforceable has recently been at issue 
before the New Zealand High Court and the Court of Appeal, in the case of Daniels v.. The Attorney-General' 
In Septemberr999 a parent ofLinda Daniels, a child with special educational needs, applied to the High Court 
for judicial review of the special education policy !mown as Special Education 2000 (SE2ooo) which had been 
introduced in r998 by the then Minister of Education. In the period before the hearing in the High Court in 
December 2 oar the plaintiffwas joined by r4 other parents of children with special educational needs. Essentially 
the plaintiffs wanted their children to have the choice of attending special education facilities where mainstreaming 
waslliappropriate or ineffective. The plaintiffs alleged that the policy ofSE2ooo, pursuant to which these facilities 
were disestablished, infringed the right to equal education of children with special educational needs as provided 
by the Education Act 1989 (NZ) • 
2 .. The legislative basis for the right to education in New Zealand, and SE2ooo 
Internationally, the right of all children to education is set out in Article r3 of the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultnral Rights, and the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child.' 
In New Zealand this right is contained in section 3 of the Education Act 1989 (NZ): 
'Except as provided in this Act or the Private Schools Conditional Integration Act r975, every person who 
is not a foreign stndent is entitled to free eruolment and free education at any state school during the 
period beginning on the person's 5th birthday and ending on the rst day of) anuary after the persons 19th 
birthday' 
Ihe provision of special education is legislatively a combination of sections 3, 8 and 9 of the Education Act r989 
(NZ) and the still existing section 98 of the Education Act 1964 (NZ) The latter Act defines 'special education' 
in section 2 as 'education for childr·en who, because ofphysical or mental handicap or ofsome educational difficulty, 
require educational treatment beyond that normally obtained in an ordinary class in a school providing primary, 
secondary or [continuing] education' 'Special education' in section 2 of the 1989 Act incorporates the 1964 
definition and adds 'education or help from a special school, special class, special clinic or special service.' 
Section 8 provides for mainstreaming as follows: 
'(r) Except as provided in this Part ofthis Act, people who have special educational needs (whether because 
of disability or otherwise) have the same rights to emol and receive education at state schools as people 
who do not.' 
Senlor· Lecturer, College of Business Massey University Wellington Campus Wellington. New Zealand 
[2003] 2 NZL R 742 (CA) 
Ss.3and8 
Ratified by New Zealand in 1993 
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Section 9 ofthe 1989 Actpwvides that where the Secretary ofEducation is satisfied that a person under 2 r should 
have special education they shall agree with the parents that the person should be emolled or direct them to emoll 
at a particular state school, special school, special class or special clinic; or agree with the parents that the person 
should have, or direct them to ensure that the person has, education or help from a special service. 4 Those special 
schools and special classes were set up pmsuant to section 98 of the Edntation Act 1964 (NZ) to cater for those 
students who are unable to be mainstreamed and required the 'special education' as envisaged by section 9 
Education Act r989 (NZ) Section ro provides a right of reconsideration of any direction made under section 
9 .. This includes an arbitiation provisions 
The picture presented by the combination of sections 8 and 9 is that a child with special needs has the right to 
attend a conventional state school which it is presumed can mal<e provision to accommodate him or her However, 
if the school is unable to do so, section 9 imposes a duty on the Seoetary of Education to agree with that child's 
parents on a direction for emolment of that child at a special school, special class or special clinic established 
by the Minister under section 98 Education Act r9 64 (NZ). That section provides as follows: 
'r Having regard to the provision ofspecial education in any locality or localities, the Minister may 
a Establish any special school; 
b.. Establish, or authorise the establishment of, any special class, clinic, or service, either as a separate unit 
or in connection with any State . school, or in connection with any public institution approved for the 
pmpose by him 
2 The Minister may likewise disestablish any special school, class, clinic, or service established under 
subsection (r) .. ifhe considers that sufficient provision is made by another similarly established special 
school, class, clinic or service, or by any other school or class in or reasonably near to the same locality 
Central to the policy known as Special Education 2 ooo (SE2 ooo) was the disestablishment of special education 
facilities and the mainstreaming of students with special needs into ordiriary classes with appropriate aid being 
provided It provided for a system ofresomcing state schools byway of three schemes dependent on the severity 
of the student's disability .. These schemes provided fimding for the schools chosen by individual students with 
special needs who qualify. A Special Education Grant was established to fund schools in respect of special needs 
students who did not qualify This money was not targeted at individual students and was allocated to schools 
on a formula based on the school's roll and the school's decile6 rating. Expenditure of funding received was to 
be decided by each school's board of trustees' in line with established guidelines which form part of the school's 
charter 8 
3.. The High Court9 
The plaintiffs ar·gned that SE2 ooo largely removed their choice and thus adversely affected their children's right 
to education. They argued that as it was fundamentally inconsistent with the schemes of both the Education 
Acts of 1964 and 1989 it was ultra vires and beyond the legal authority of the Crown. Further they argned that 
the policy failed to cater for the educational needs of the children and thus it was in breach of the provisions 
ofthe Education Act 1989 (NZ) and the continningpwvisions of the 1964 Act Specifically they argned that SE2 ooo 
deprived their children of their rights contained in sections 3 and 8 of the Education Act r989 (NZ) 
The plaintiff's argnmentreliedheavilyon the report ofjulpooo by Dr Cathy Wylie. Dr Wylie had beenretained 
by the Crown to report on the effectiveness of the changes implemented by SE2 ooo and she had concluded as 
follows:Io 
Education Act 1989 (NZ} s .. 9{1) (a) and (b) 
S. 10(4) Education Act 1989 (NZ) 
All state schools in New Zealand have a decile rating of Ho. 
Pursuant to the Education Act 1989 (NZ) each New Zealand state school is administered by a locally elected board of trustees which has full discretion 
to control and manage the school, subject to the laws of New Zealand. . 
Under s 61 of the Education Act 1989 (NZ) each school board of trustees is required to formulate a chartei which byv:irtue of s 64 acts as an undertaking 
from that board to the Minister. to satisfY requirements imposed by statute and by the National Educational Guidelines and the National Administration 
Guidelines. 
Unreported Judgment of the High Court of New Zealand, Auckland Registry. Baragwanath J, 3 Aprilzooz. Mr615-SW99 
'
0 Wylie, C. (20oo) PickingupthePieces-Re'liewofSpedal Education2ooo-He Tatan"tanga Mote MataUial1ga Motuhake MinisterofEducation Wellington 
NZ. atp 46 , 
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'There is no doubt in the sector that a sizeable number or children with special needs are missing out 
on the support they need to participate as much in school and class life as any other child, and to make 
real gains fiom their tinre at school There are undoubtedly students who have continuing needs 
throughout their education who do not fit the OTRS categories.' 
She said that the disestablishment ofstaffing for special needs units within regular schools had had a profound 
effect. She said that this: 
' exposed the absence of any government role in ensuring that there was satisfactory provision for students 
with special needs at the local level. It left parents feeling angry, impotent and betrayed It remains all 
too easy for local schools to evade responsibility for the inclusion of students with special needs ' 
She went on to say that those schools which were in the forefront of including students with special needs in 
meaningful ways, referred to by her as 'beacon schools', were struggling to maintain best practice faced with 
a lack of resources She said:n 
'There is some e"idence that the units, lilce the special schools, have become more attractive to parents 
In some areas, other units who served a range of special needs have closed, and parents who found benefits 
for their children in such settings have had to find other options, some at considerable traveling time 
(and cost) from their homes. Others have found it difficult to find mainstream schools that will take their 
child, or have found that what is offered is poor quality, albeit well-intentioned, or insufficient 
(maindumping) ' 
Baragwanath J held it to be relevant that the repmtof Dr Wylie showed the scheme ofdisestablishmentof special 
needs facilities pursuant to section 98(2) had led to the emergence of these beacon schools .. He said:" 
'By such policy there has, at least de facto, been something of a swing baclcin the direction of the special 
needs concept that at least some proponents of mainstreaming appear to have considered unnecessary ' 
In his view the report made clear that the popularity of these schools demonstrated that there was a need for 
such facilities, and that the funding of them was inadequate. 
Accordingly, the judge agreed with the plaintiffs He said:'3 
'Where a child's needs are met in an mdinary school, the Crown's duty in respect of that child has been 
discharged Where a conventional school is incapable of meeting a child's need, the Crown has an obligation, 
pursuant to s. 9 of the Education Act 1989, to provide special education to the child sufficient to enable 
the child to receive some sort of worthwhile education' 
While he pointed to the difference in opinions held by experts on the desirability or otherwise of 'mainstreaming' 
special needs students he emphasized that this was a pedagogical matter which was outside the ambit of the 
court's discretiOn The decision to be made in this case was inespect:ive of the advantages and disadvantages 
of such a system At the outset he set out what he saw to be the interrelationship of the Crown and the courts 
in this context:r4 
,, 
'The Crown has the authority and the responsibility to determine what policies are to be preferred and 
to apply public resources to secure a principled and workable regime It has access to expert knowledge 
and resources not possessed by the Court. Moreover, it is a basic constitutional principle that policy decisions 
should be made by and in the name of the Crown, whose Ministers are answerable to Parliament and 
to the electorate. By contrast, the Court's role is simply to determine whether the law has been infringed 
and if so to award conventional relief, which in the present sphere is customarily by way of formal 
declaration of rights' 
Footnote 10 above atp. 70. 
Referring to Wylie, C., footnote w above at p 75 
Footnote 9 above, at para. 45 
Footnote 9 above at para. 4 
!JELP • 2005 ·· !SSUE 1 -· 2 
DAN JELS V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS AND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
In the judge's view the policy of SE2 ooo was in contravention ofthe educational obligations owed by the Minister 
of Education to children with special needs He saw the right to education in these te:tms:rs 
'Faced with the choice between giving substance to the "entitlement' imd "rights" to education, or emptying 
fbem oflegally enforceable content, I am satisfied thai-ihe' former must be adopted. In enacting s. 3 the 
Legislature deliberately conferred an entitlement to education In my view it cannot have intended such 
entitlement to entail anything less fban: 
it must not be clearly unsuitable (and in that specific sense ofit suitable) for the pupil 
it must be regular and systematic' . 
The Crown appealed 
4-- The Court of Appeal' 6 
The decision of the court was delivered by Keith) At the outset he stressed thatfbe statutory right to education, 
and the corresponding legal obligation on education authorities to meet the education needs of each individual, 
apply equally to all children it respective of whether they have special needs or not. In the view of fbe court the 
right to a suitable education was promoted by the establishment of a system by which it was provided, rather 
than in its being a judicially-enforceable right On this pointfbe court stated that it did not favomfbe 'all or nothing' 
approach to the justiciability of rights in education which had been adopted by Baragwanath). Keith) said:'' 
'We retrnn to the Judge's [Baragwanath )] finding about s. 3 . Any requirement fbatthe education be "regular 
and systematic" is met in its essence, it seems to us, by the statutmy requirements including those for 
niininrum days and homs, teacher registration and cuniculurn. Those and the other features of the Act 
mentioned above, togefber with the very opaqueness ofthe proposed standard, also appear to us to negate 
a judicially enforceable "not clearly unsuitable" general standard and the grave difficulty it presents for 
judicial supervision 
'I o repeat, while there are rights under the 1989 Act that can be enforced by court process [such as natural 
justice on suspension and expulsion], those rights do not include generally, and abstractly, formulated 
rights of the kind stated by the Judge Rafber, the rights are essentially those specifically established by 
and under the legislation which, to recall the) udge's formulation, do in themselves provide for regularity 
and system and are designed to ensure appropriate quality.' 
The judge refened to fbe decisions, particularly those from the United Kingdom, which Baragwanath) of the 
High Court had drawn on in support of his opinion '9 He concluded fbat the cases were oflimited assistance 
to either the plaintiffs or the Crown, as each one concerned an action by an individual student, eifber inreliance 
on a common law duty of care or on a breach of markedly different legislation or constitutional provisions Keith 
) pointed particularly to the House of Lords decision in Phelps v. Hillingdon London Borough'o in which the 
plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing the negligence offbeir local education authorities .. He said that as it was 
an action tal< en by individuals who alleged a failure to assess learning disabilities and to provide remedial assistance 
it was distinguishable from the present case. Futhermore, he said that their lordships there had been careful 
to hold that damages could not be sought for breach ofstatutory duty." Sinrilarly Keifb) was able to distinguish 
R v East Sussex County Council, ex parte I andy" as that action was founded on specific facts relating to a failure 
to provide suitable education for a student suffering from ME who was unable to attend a regular school. However, 
'; Footnote 9 above at para IJ7 
'
6 [2003]2 NZIR 742 
!!7 [2003]2 NZIR 742 para. 82 
'
8 Footnote q above at para. 83. . 
'9 Jnre 5 (Minors) Care Order.. Implementation of Care Plan[2o02] 2 AC 291; Phelps v. Hillingdon London Borough[2ooi]2 AC 619; R v. East SUssex County 
Council, e.x parteTandy[1998] AC 74; and the Irish case Sinnott v: Minister of Education [ 2oor] 2 IR 505 
"" [2001]2 AC 619. 
Footnote 20 above at para. 87 
,_ [1998] AC 714 
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he did concede that an important point to be taken from that case was the court's recognition that the financial 
resources of the education authority were an inelevant consideration in relation to their obligation to individual 
students. 
I he judges disagreed with the view of Baragwanath j that the Irish case of Sinnott v. Minister of Education"' 
provided clear support for the comt's jmisdiction to 'declare a special needs student's entitlement to education 
appropriate to his or her needs' "4 Keith j stated that the dispute in that case had been essentially about remedies, 
it having been accepted that the State had breached the plaintiffs constitutional rights He said that it did not 
support the notion that there was a freestanding general right enforceable by the courts. 
It is inrpmtant that the reluctance ofthe Court ofAppeal to recognize the justiciability of a general right to education 
did not detract from its recognition of specific rights which exist within the education system Keith j reinforced 
the court's acceptance that there are individual rights which are legally enforceable when he said:'5 
'Io return to the education legislation, there can be no doubt that in addition to the statutory powers of 
central government to intervene (notwithstanding the emphasis ofthe reforms introduced by Tomorrows 
Schools· on local, especially parental administration) [the educational refmms enacted by the Eaucation 
Act 1989 (NZ)], some of the failures of a school to comply with its obligations could give rise to legal 
proceedings In other words, we do not fmd helpful the "all or nothing" or "justiciability or not" 
discussions in the judgment below and submissions. The schools have duties correlative to the students' 
statutory rights and those general rights are capable oflegal enforcement.' 
The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown's appeal in its determination that no breaches of sections 3, 8 or 9 had 
been established The plaintiffs however did retain some victory from the High Court decision in that the Court 
ofAppeal agreed with Baragwanath j that the Minister of Education had acted in breach of section 98(2) Education 
Act 198 9 (NZ). I his was on the basis that the conect procedure as prescribed by the statutory provision had not 
been followed before the special classes, units and services were disestablished pursuant to SE2ooo. However, 
the comt chew no consequence from that conclusion and remitted the case back to Baragwanath j in the High 
Court for determination of relief 
Issues relating to discrimination arising under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 had been the subject 
of extensive submissions fiom all parties, including the New Zealand H mnan Rights Commissioner as intervenor 
However, time constraints at the Court of Appeal hearing meant that the judges did not address the challenge 
by the parents and the Human Rights Commissioner to Baragwanath j's finding ofno discrinrination. It was 
disappointing that the oppmtunitywas lost for judicial discussion of an issue of such fundamental importance 
5· Conclusion 
As an application for judicial review rather than a private claim for damages, this action was founded on an 
essentially different basis to the cases in other jurisdictions referred to above. Its significance however lies in 
the consideration of many ofthe issues which are fundamental to the provision of education in New Zealand, 
partirularly for those children with special needs It provides for New Zealand jurisprudence the first 
comprehensive consideration ofthe nature and justiciability of the statutory 'rights' and 'entitlements' to education. 
!twas the primary finding ofthe Court of Appeal that the right to education is the right to a system, made available 
by legislation, which provides the framework for acceptable standards and accountability, in the words of Keith 
):'' 
'So, in essence "education" is a general right to partalce of a system as provided by and delivered pursuant 
to legislation, rather than a specific right, breach of which would be enforceable by individuals.' 
'
3 [zoor] 2 IR 505 
-'4 Footnote 9 above at para. 92 
•> Footnote ry above at para 79· 
26 [zoo3]2NZIR742.atpara 83 
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It is significant however, that the Court did preserve the ability of students to establish breaches of duties owed 
to them as individuals In this context this decision is in line with the courts in the UK and Ireland 
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